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PAVING THE ROAD:- A CHARLES IlAMILTON 
HOUSTON APPROACH TO SECURING TRANS RIGHTS 
JENNIFER L. LEVI·· 
I. INTRODUCTIONl 
Securing the rights of transgender people2 requires a 
comprehensive and long-term litigation strategy. As other 
commentators3 have explained, most courts that have addressed 
discrimination claims brought by trans gender people have 
excluded us from the legal protections of the laws.4 The 
* The title of this ArtiCle derives from the incisive documentary, THE ROAD TO 
BROWN, (California Newsreel 1989), which details the life and work of Charles Hamilton 
Houston. 
*. Jennifer Levi is a Staff Attorney at Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders 
(GLAD), a public-interest legal organization working throughout New England for 
equality and justice for gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender people and people with 
HIV/AlDS. 
1. lowe a big debt of gratitude to Fatma Marouf, who provided extensive research 
and significant written contributions to this piece. Many thanks as well to the following 
people who talked to me at great length about the ideas contained in this Article, as well 
as legal issues relating to this topic: Paisley Currah, Susan Donnelly, Martha Ertman, 
Stephanie Gaynor, Shannon Minter and Liz Seaton. 
2. This Article presumes that transgender people-people who do not conform to 
stereotypes of masculinity or femininity-should have the same rights to housing, credit, 
public accommodations, health care and equal treatment in employment that non-
transgender people have. This right to equal treatment is what is meant in this Article 
by references to "trans rights.· 
This Article takes a broad view of who transgender people are. By using broad 
nomenclature, trans rights are meant to include the rights of all gender nonconforming 
people (which may include pre- and post-operative transsexual people, feminine men and 
masculine women, as well as those people who are intersexed). For mOre comprehensive 
discussions of who may be categorized as transgender, see Mary Coombs, Characteristics 
of Transgenderism, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 237-42 (1998); Kristine W. Holt, 
Comment, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a 
Transgender Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 319 n.3 (1997); see also MARTINE 
ROTHBLATI', THE APARTHEID OF SEX 16-19 (1995); Debbie Mitchell, Defining 
Transvestism, 70 TAPESTRY J. 35, 35-36 (1995). 
3. See generally, Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The 
Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & 
MARy J. WOMEN & L. 37 (2000) (analyzing statutes and ordinances that purport to 
protect transgender people); Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues In Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 279 (1999) (compiling 
articles and commentary). 
4. The faulty reasoning in cases excluding transgender people from protections 
under sex discrimination laws suggests judges were motivated more by bias than legal 
reasoning. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc. 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (carefully 
distinguishing among transsexuals, transvestites and homosexuals, but then lumping 
together transsexuals and homosexuals for the purpose of statutory construction). For a 
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Orwellian rhetoric5 in those cases suggests that it is bias and 
bigotry, rather than logic, that determined their outcomes. 
Because prejudice against trans people is extraordinarily 
ingrained and pervasive,6 there needs to be a long-term litigation 
strategy . (rather than an immediate full frontal7 attack) to 
reverse the trend of earlier negative decisions and to build on 
recent precedent that establishes trans rights. 8 In addition to 
creating the building blocks necessary to overturn earlier bad 
cases, a long-term strategy would provide the time necessary for 
political activists to continue to move forward, laying the 
groundwork through coordinated educational9 and legislative 
strategies. lO This work that has already begun in earnest is 
detailed discussion of the problems of statutory construction, see Susan E. Keller, 
Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 375-77 (1999). 
In the earlier case of Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 
1977), the court narrowly framed the issue as "whether an employee may be discharged, 
consistent with Title VII, for initiating the process of sex transformation." Id. at 661 
(emphasis added). In reality, the issue raised by the case included pre- and post-
operative transsexual employees alike. 
5. See discussion and source cited infra note 133. The Ninth Circuit found a 
meaningful distinction between sex and "change of sex," which rendered discrimination 
because of the former, but not the latter, actionable under Title VII. 
6. The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs Annual Report on Anti-
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Violence reported that although anti-
transgender violence accounted for only about two to four percent of incidents between 
1995 and 1999, those incidents accounted for approximately. twenty percent of all 
reported anti-LGBT murders, and approximately forty percent of total incidents of police- . 
initiated violence. See Sticks and Stones: The Nexus Between Hate Speech and Violence, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 391-96 (1999). Despite these figures, the Hate Crime 
Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, l06th Congo (1999), H.R. 1082, l06th Congo (1999), which 
would have amended 18 U.S.C. § 245 to include gender, was defeated. Id. 
7. The use of the term "full frontal" (as in full frontal attack), including its graphic 
association with anatomy, is intentional. The power (and shock) of a full frontal is 
highlighted by recent movies like THE CRYING GAME (Miramax, 1992) and THE FULL 
MoNTY (Fox, 1997). As the protagonists in these films understood, a full frontal view 
typically evokes a strong response. Getting the desired response, however, as the 
protagonists learned, often requires doing significant work to create the right context or 
set the stage for the full frontal. This Article argues that selecting the right time for a 
full frontal attack and taking the time and opportunities to do the educational work in 
the courts, as well as the culture, is critical to paving the road to trans rights. 
8. See infra part IV.A. 
9. Trans advocacy has begun in earnest with the establishment of several national 
advocacy groups dedicated to creating awareness of trans people and our concerns. 
Examples include It's Time America, Gender Public Advocacy Coalition and National 
Transgender Advocacy Coalition. The work of these groups includes educating 
individuals about the need to include trans people in non-discrimination laws. 
10. For example, Minnesota enacted an anti-discrimination law in 1993 that 
expressly protects trans gender and gender variant people in employment, housing and 
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critical to achieving the long term goals articulated in this 
Article. 
The long, hard struggle to end segregation laws and 
practices in this country offers an analogous context from which 
trans civil rights activists can draw some guidance. Today, 
nearlyll no one would argue that the principle of "separate but 
equal," articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson,12 was anything other 
than a specious attempt to use seemingly principled legal 
analysis to maintain white supremacy.13 Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court waited nearly sixty years before overturning the 
public accommodations. • Minnesota's law also provides enhanced penalties for hate 
crimes committed against these groups. See PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, 
POLICY INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN 
RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTMSTS AND POLICYMAKERS 17, 
67-68 (2000), available at http://www.ngltf.orgllibrary/index. cfm. California amended its 
state hate crimes statute to include transgender and gender variant people in 1998 and 
Vermont and Missouri adopted similar measures in 1999. [d. In 2000, bills that would 
create state·wide non-discrimination laws for trans people were introduced in California, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine and Vermont. [d. On November 9, 2000, the Connecticut 
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities issued a declaratory ruling that 
transgender people are covered by the state's law prohibiting sex discrimination. See 
Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Comm'n Human Rights & 
Opportunities Nov. 9, 2000), at http://www.state.ct.uslchro/metapages/hearingoffice/ 
declaratoryrulings IDRDoe.htm (Nov. 9,2000) (hereinafter Declaratory Ruling]; see also 
Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96,99 (D.D.C. 1994) (fmding that 
the termination of a post-operative transsexual person for "retaining some masculine 
traits" violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act that specifically prohibits 
discrimination due to appearance); City of Chicago, v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 
1978) (holding unconstitutional, as applied to transgender defendants, a ChicagQ 
ordinance that fmed persons appearing in public "in a dress not belonging to his or her 
sex, with intent to conceal his or her sex"); Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp 76, 79-80 (S.D. 
Tex. 1980) (holding a Houston ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to appear 
in public dressed with intent to disguise his/her true sex as that of the opposite sex 
unconstitutional as applied to individuals undergoing psychiatric therapy in preparation 
for sex·reassignment surgery). For a summary of ordinances protecting transgenders 
across the country, see Currah & Minter, supra note 3, at app. 
11. The modifier "nearly" is used here only to note the persistence of racist voices 
that would turn back the clock on critical legal victories of the Twentieth Century that 
chipped away at the stranglehold of racism in this country. See Kim Murphy, Jury 
Verdict Could Bankrupt Aryans, L.A TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at AI; Sean Scully, Southern 
Party Ready to -Ride with Forrest,· WASH. TIMES, July 3,2000, at AI. 
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483(1954). 
13. Though there is nearly no remaining controversy regarding the sophistry behind 
the reasoning of Plessy, recalling the Court's reasoning helps spotlight the bigotry behind 
the outcome. The Court wrote that "the underlying fallacy" of plaintift's challenge to 
segregated conditions was "the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races 
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of 
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it." [d. at 551. 
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constitutional principle of "separate but equal" in Brown v. 
Board of Education. 14 
The sequence of legal events leading to Brown was not 
coincidental or happenstance. To the contrary, it was the result 
of an extraordinarily thoughtful and intricate strategy devised 
and implemented by the brilliant, idealistic and pragmatic 
Charles Hamilton Houston. 15 This Article looks to those plans 
drawn up by the architect of the modern Civil Rights movement 
as the inspiration for a trans rights litigation strategy. 
Mer briefly detailing the life of Charles Hamilton Houston, 
Section II focuses on the legal strategy he designed and carried 
out to overturn Plessy. It continues by drawing some conclusions 
about what Houston's plan teaches about the struggle for trans 
rights and a trans litigation strategy. Section III examines the 
reasons certain cases that challenge assumptions about sex and 
gender, such as those brought in the employment context that 
raise the specter of "men in dresses," as well as those that raise 
questions about who gets to use what bathroom, may not be 
ideal initial cases to pursue. This Article argues that avoiding 
such cases early on in the struggle for trans rights in favor of 
other, less emotionally charged ones, would be most effective in 
creating trans-positive law. This incremental approach, while 
far from ideal, would allow time to do the important work of 
educating society about the incorrect assumptions upon which 
sex stereotypes are based and the harm that results therefrom. 
Section IV details some of the construction materials that are 
already in place upon which to build a strategy based on 
Houston's model. Finally, Section V describes a recent case 
brought on behalf of a transgender person that fits into the 
strategy described here and explores how that case may provide 
the next step in this Charles Hamilton Houston model of 
pursuing trans rights through impact litigation. 
II. CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON-PROVIDING A PLAN 
Surely a visionary, Charles Hamilton Houston was the 
primary architect of the legal strategy for overturning the 
principle of "separate but equal" established in Plessy. Sadly, he 
14. 347 U.S. at 494·95; see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: 
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,1127-29 
(1997). 
15. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 106 (1976); GENNA RAE McNEIL, 
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 4, 
134 (1983). 
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died four years before the culmination of his life's work. It is his 
patience and long-term view that provide inspiration and legal 
strategies for others involved in other civil rights struggles. 
Other authors have chronicled his life's work and penned worthy 
tributes to his OpUS. 16 This Article does not purport to be a 
biography of Houston, nor can it do justice to the depth and 
breadth of his work. Rather, it hopes to draw some guidance 
from his life, highlighting some of his thoughts and strategies in 
the process. 
Houston was born in 1895,17 one year before the Supreme 
Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. Educated at Harvard 
Law School, he was considered to be '"one of the brightest men 
on campus .... 18 Mter graduating from Harvard, having served on 
the editorial board of its law review, he spent a period of time 
traveling and studying abroad, practicing in a private firm, 
teaching law and serving as the dean of Howard University's law 
school. He was the "central figure in Howard's efforts to gain 
accreditation, "19 thus legitimating the legal education of Mrican-
Americans and building the basis for educating an army of 
lawyers to carry out the civil rights litigation plan he was in the 
process of designing. 20 
In 1935, Houston took a crucial step in implementing this 
plan, leaving Howard University Law School so he could serve as 
Special Counsel to the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP). Although he was initially reluctant 
to accept the position with the NAACP, he eventually did so "'on 
the condition that the program of litigation be conducted as a 
protracted legal struggle based on ... cases.' He opposed an 
immediate frontal attack on the 'separate but equal' doctrine, 
favoring a more methodical approach at the state and federal 
levels. "21 He defended his approach on the grounds that it 
would: (1) "lay the groundwork for the test cases that would 
ultimately come before the United States Supreme Court"22 and 
serve as the foundation for overturning Plessy, (2) provide the 
16. E.g., KLUGER, supra note 15, at 105-280; MCNEIL, supra note 15; J. Clay Smith, 
Jr., Forgotten Hero, 98 HARv. L. REv. 482 (1984) (reviewing GENNA RAE MCNEIL, 
GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CML RIGHTS 
(1983». 
17. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 24; Smith, supra note 16, at 483. 
18. See MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 51 (quoting Interview with R.P. Alexander (Sept. 
18,1972». 
19. See Smith, supra note 16, at 486. 
20. rd. 
21. rd. at 488 (quoting MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 134). 
22. rd. 
10 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 7:5 
time necessary to engage in broadscale educational efforts to 
change minds in the "court of public opinion,"23 and (3) "[aJllow 
Houston time to develop competent Black lawyers to 'wage the 
fight that no white men could be expected to sustain.'"24 
One of the key pieces to the foundation Houston laid was the 
choice not to wage an immediate and direct attack on "separate 
but equal," but rather to target cases in which related issues25 
would be decided, destabilizing the foundations of Plessy in a 
piecemeal fashion.26 Houston's plan worked, in part, because he 
focused on areas in which whites were most vulnerable to attack 
and least likely to respond emotionally.27 For example, Houston 
chose to focus his efforts first on desegregating graduate and 
professional schools, only later moving to secondary and 
eventually primary education, which stirred stronger racist 
emotions.28 When Houston did shift his focus to elementary 
education, he started outside of the classroom. For example, 
Houston sought to equalize the transportation available to black 
and white school children during a time when white children 
were bused to school if they lived far away but black 
schoolchildren had to walk regardless of the distance.29 Although 
many moderate whites would not express anger at the idea of 
providing additional facilities to black school children, they 
might be more easily angered at the notion of providing for 
blacks when they perceived these provisions as detracting from 
whites.3o 
23. In an article published in the official NAACP magazine, Houston wrote, "Law 
suits mean little unless supported by public opinion." MCNEIL, supra note 15; at 139 
(quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, Don't Shout Too Soon, CRISIS 43, Mar., 1936, at 79). 
24. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 136 (citation omitted). 
25. For example, Houston proposed initially targeting school systems that were 
separate but clearly unequal E.g., Missouri ex reI. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938). To make the point even clearer, Houston began targeting educational facilities in 
states that provided no graduate professional programs for blacks, much less separate 
ones. E.g., Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 594 (Md. 1936) (holding that a black applicant 
meeting the University of Maryland law school's requirements for admission was entitled 
to a writ of mandamus compelling his admission). 
26. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 134. 
27. KLUGER, supra note 15, at 136. 
28. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 135. 
29. Earlier cases upheld segregated school programs even though their existence 
forced black schoolchildren to walk farther than their white counterparts. E.g., Dameron 
v. Bayless, 126 P. 273, 274-75 (Ariz. 1912) (holding that distance, inconvenience and the 
existence of railroad tracks on the route to school were irrelevant to the issue of equality 
of schools). Houston saw challenges to school transportation as a way to create a 
bulwark in elementary education long before he thought the time was right for a direct 
challenge to segregation in elementary education. MCNEIL, supra note 15, at 137. 
30. Houston pointed to two other reasons for focusing on transportation: First, the 
consolidation of rural schools depended on getting children to school at a reasonable 
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Only a step-by-step process could generate the long-term 
effects that Houston desired. Houston recognized· that the 
'"maw [is] ... effective ... always within its limitations,'''31 and 
it would be '"too much to expect the court to go against the 
established and crystallized social customs.'''32 White people 
strongly supported segregation, relying largely on essentialist 
notions about differences between whites and blacks.33 Such 
notions about the racial differences and moral inferiority of some 
races are today largely rejected, but still firmly held with regard 
to sex.34 At the time of Houston's work, many whites still 
subscribed to the nineteenth century idea that blacks were 
inherently intellectually and morally inferior and could weaken 
the white race just by interracial association. Those whites who 
were more "progressive" feared interracial marriage and the 
attendant fears of amalgamation or marginalization of the white 
race.35 One Southern school principal expressed his support for 
segregation by suggesting that African-Americans were not as 
fully human as whites: '"[Black children] are like little animals. 
There is no civilization in their homes. They shouldn't hold up 
white children who have had these things for centuries. They are 
not as clean .... Why should we contaminate our race?'''36 This 
reasoning was hardly isolated. Even in the North, the number of 
segregated schools increased dramatically between 1910 and 
1940, especially at the elementary schoolleve1.37 
time; and second, plodding to school did psychological damage by creating an "inferiority 
complex." McNEIL, supra note 15, 137. 
31. 1d. at 134 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston & Leon Ransom, The George 
Crawford Case: An Experiment in Social Statesmanship, NATION, July 4, i934, at 18). 
32. 1d. at 135 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, "Proposed Legal Attacks on 
Education Discrimination," 8, C429, NAACP Records (on me with author». 
33. Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown,. 1985 DUKE 
L.J. 624,637-42. . 
34. See Ashlie v. Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12516, at ··14-15 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979) (analogizing a transsexual individual's 
right of privacy to that of an individual who sought to be surgically changed into a 
donkey); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) ("There are some things 
we cannot will into being. They just are."). 
35. STEVEN J. GoULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 105-73 (1981) (discussing and 
criticizing nineteenth century studies on race). 
36. Davison M. Douglas, The Limits of Law in Accomplishing Racial Change: School 
Segregation in the Pre-Brown North, 44 UCLA L. REv. 677, 711-12 (1997) (quoting 
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 198 (1943». 
37. 1d. at 705-10 (discussing the increase in segregation of primary schools in New 
Jersey, Ohio and Illinois between 1910 and 1940). Segregation took the form of "separate 
schools, separate buildings on the same plot of land, and separate classrooms within the 
same building." 1d. at 709. 
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Even courts that· understood the inequity of racial 
segregation as a basic social construct, as well as "neutral" 
judges, often minimized glaring discrepancies between white and 
black schools when analyzing "equality" under the "separate but 
equal" . doctrine. 38 One article published in the 1954 Harvard 
Law Review openly recognized that decisions "inevitably 
result[ed], at least in part, from subjective influences which have 
little to do with the law or the bare facts in the record."39 
Perhaps the most powerful influence was the essentialist idea 
that "[t]he separation of the human family into races . . . is as 
certain as anything in nature. "40 Instead of anEUyzing the 
complex distinctions between substantial and insubstantial 
equality, judges invoked comfortable, clear categories that most 
whites seemed to accept. 
Just as white people feared interracial mixing because it 
could lead to miscegenation, a disruption of the "natural~ state of 
belonging definitively to one race or another,41 trans gender 
people seem to unsettle what sociologists term the "natural 
attitude," the assumption "that every human being is either a 
male 'or a female."42 For those who- subscribe to this view of 
binary sexes as natural, transgender people are extraordinarily 
threatening because we "call into question the idea that 
[existing] gender categories are discrete, mutually exclusive, and 
stable."43 This fear of destabilization of gender categories seems 
.to lead courts to act in irrational ways. For example, in Littleton 
v. Prange,44 a Texas appeals court refused to recognize a 
transsexual woman as legally female despite the fact that she 
underwent sex-reassignment surgery and legally changed her 
birth certificate.45 The court's primary justification for refusing 
to recognize Christie Lee Littleton's medical and legal status 
38. Robert A. Leflar &; Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 
MARV. L. REV. 377, 399 (1954). 
39. Id. at 394. 
40. Berea ColI. v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623, 626 (Ky. 1906), affd, 211 U.S. 45 
(1908) (upholding a law prohibiting racially integrated education in Kentucky). For a 
more extensive discussion of this case, see Hovenkamp, supra note 33, at 630-31. 
41. The Kentucky court stated that "from social amalgamation it is but a step to 
illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage." Berea, 94 S.W. at 628. 
42. SUZANNE KESSLER &; WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 1 (1978). 
43. Adrienne Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as 
a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1483 (1994). 
44. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999). 
45. Id. at 231; see also In re Estate of Gardiner, Estate No. 9908 PE 00119, slip op. at 
7-9 (Dist. Ct. Kan. Jan. 21, 2000) (using language from Littleton verbatim in granting 
summary judgment against the surviving transsexual spouse in a probate action). 
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sounds very much like a dictatorial parent who refuses to 
explain a decision by pulling rank, saying "because I say so." The 
Littleton court ignored medical and legal evidence and concluded 
that Littleton is male by saying tersely that some things "just 
are. "46 This court's irrational, knee-jerk analysis demonstrates 
the need for a long-term strategy to secure trans rights, one that 
accounts for social, as well as legal impediments to trans rights, 
just as Houston's did. The strategy proposed here, which 
sketches out guidelines for cases to litigate, analogizes gender 
binarists47 to the racist opponents Houston faced. 
III. EARLY CASES TO AVOID TRA YELLING ON THE ROAD AHEAD 
Viewing the road ahead to securing trans civil rights 
through the Houston lens counsels in favor of crafting an 
analogous long-term litigation strategy. Identifying cases in 
which gender binarists are both most vulnerable and least likely 
to react out of anger or other emotions is key to any long-term 
strategy to secure rights for transgender people. Like Houston's, 
this approach requires a concurrent, aggressive cultural 
education component focused on exposing the myths of sex 
stereotypes and highlighting the damage they do. 
Generally speaking, gender binarists seem most threatened, 
angriest, and irrationally emotional48 when faced with cases in 
46. Littleton,9 S.W.3d at 231. 
47. For lack of better term, I use "gender binarists" to refer to people who cling 
tightly to a binary division of the sexes. That is, people who believe one is born either a 
woman or a man and that there is neither fluidity nor permeability to those categories. 
Further, most gender binarists think that the categories of male and female are discrete, 
having no points of overlap. The fiercest of gender binarists would support the outcome 
in Littleton, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, where a Texas appeals court 
determined that despite both legal and medical evidence to the contrary, Christie Lee 
Littleton was a man because the doctors had ascribed to her that sex category at her 
birth. Other gender binarists may be more "moderate" in their beliefs. For example, I 
would still ascribe the term gender binarist to those who "do not view the recognition of 
different dress norms for males and females to be offensive or illegal stereotyping," even 
though they may object to a particular justification for a given dress code. Carroll v. 
Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.17 (7th Cir. 1979) (striking down 
dress code based on the premise that "women cannot be expected to exercise good 
judgment in choosing business apparel, whereas men can"). 
48. Cases involving transgender school teachers have yielded negative precedent that 
relies upon the style of rhetoric used by nineteenth century white separatists. Grossman 
v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16261, at *2 
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 1975) (holding that by changing sex, Grossman "underwent a 
fundamental and complete change in !her) role and identification to society, thereby 
rendering !herselfl incapable to teach children . . . because of the potential her presence 
in the classroom presents for psychological harm to the students"); see also Ashlie v. 
Chester-Upland Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12516, at *8 (E.D. 
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two categories: (1) any claim involving a bathroom and (2) those 
raising the specter of "men in dresses" in the workplace.49 It is 
the. motivating forces behind these fears on which the next 
sections focus. 
A. About the Bathrooms 
The separation of men's and women's bathrooms is a well-
established cultural practice, and indeed, one mandated by law 
in some jurisdictions.5o The specter of unisex bathrooms 
apparently strikes fear in the heart of many Americans. In fact, 
the threat of mandatory unisex bathrooms was an argument 
used to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment in the late 1970s.51 
Even when the person who uses the "wrong" rest room is not 
transgender, violating "urinary segregation"52 can provoke 
hysterical reactions.53 The situation may, however, be far worse 
for a transgender person whose idea of the "right" rest room 
differs from that ofhislher co-workers and employer. 
Pa. May 9, 1979) (analogizing a transsexual teacher to an animal: "It might just as easily 
be argued that the right of privacy protects a person's decision to be surgically trans-
formed into a donkey."). The Ashlie court heard extensive expert testimony as to the 
"grave, psychological effects" that a transsexual school teacher would have on students. 
Id. Keller argues that the Ashlie court worried that a male role model who became a 
female role model might influence the sexual orientation of teenage boys. See Keller, 
supra note 4, at 378. Keller's argument is even more powerful when one takes into 
account Craig Lind's assertion that "[tlhe legal regulation of childhood sexuality is ... 
the sphere in which the passion for the promotion of heterosexuality is most striking." 
Craig Lind, Law, Childhood Innocence and Sexuality, in LEGAL QUEERIES 81, 84 (Leslie 
J. Moran et al. eds., 1998). Lind points out that while people fear that "[ulnrestrained 
sexual tolerance may produce divergent sexualities on a much larger scale," social 
historians have shown that queer identities emerged when formal tolerance was very 
low. Id. at 90. This irrational fear of transgender people teaching school was most 
recently seen in the case of Dana Rivers, a popular and award-winning California 
schoolteacher. Rivers was flred after she· notilled her principal that she intended to 
undergo sex-reassignment surgery. See Eric Bailey, Teacher Quits in Settlement of Sex-
Change Furor, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1999, at A3. 
49. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 57-60. 
50. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 133 (West 1996). 
51. GINETTE CASTRO, AMERICAN FEMINISM: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 208 
(Elizabeth Loverde-Bagwel trans., 1990). 
52. MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSSDRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY 
47-48 (1992) (questioning Jacques Lacan, The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, in 
ECRITS: A SELECTION 151 (Alan Sheridan trans., Norton) (1977». 
53. The city of Houston·, for example, spent $10,000 prosecuting a woman who used 
the men's room at a concert because the line for the women's room was too long. Woman 
Is Acquitted in Trial for Using the Men's Room, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1990, at A8. 
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In several reported cases, employers instructed pre-
operative male-to-female trans gender individuals not to use the 
women's bathroom.54 This situation escalated into a written 
disciplinary warning in Doe v. Boeing, Co. 55 after several co-
workers complained. 56 Similarly, in Sommers v. Budget 
Marketing, Inc.,57 "a number of female employees indicated they 
would quit if Sommers were permitted to use the restroom 
facilities assigned· to female personnel. "58 The court upheld 
Budget's dismissal of Sommers for "misrepresenting" herself as 
female and causing "a disruption of the company's work 
routine. "59 The disruption, however, goes both ways. In 
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson CO.,60 co-workers found Holloway's 
use of the men's room while she was transitioning "'very 
disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned.,"61 Although 
Holloway was anatomically male, she caused "disruption" in the 
men's room because her appearance was feminine. Thus, for a 
trans gender person, awkward situations can arise regardless of 
which bathroom is used. Although sex segregation of bathrooms 
has been distinguished from racial segregation of bathrooms on 
the basis that sex segregation is not degrading,62 trans gender 
people are degraded if segregation effectively prevents them 
54. Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Dobre v. Nat'l 
R.R. Passenger Corp.(AMTRACK), 850 F. Supp 284, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Doe v. Boeing, 
Co., 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993). 
55. 846 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1993). 
56. [d. at 533. 
57. 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982). 
58. [d. at 748-49. 
59. [d. 
60. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). 
61. [d. at 661 n.1 (quoting affidavit describing "personal problems" created by 
Holloway's transitioning appearance). 
62. RICHARD A. W ASSERSTROM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDlES 20-21 
(1980); see also Louise M. Antony, Back to Arulrogeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us 
About Equality, 9 J. CONTEMPl'. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 4 (1998). 
The purpose of segregating bathrooms [by race) was not simply to keep 
whites and blacks apart, but to keep blacks from defiling the bathrooms 
used by whites; it was ... instituted by whites without any consideration 
of the needs and desires of blacks. The situation appears to be different, 
though, with the sexual segregation of bathrooms; here the arrangement 
seems as much desired by women as by men, and there is no 
presumption that members of one sex can defile members of the other by 
using the same toilets. 
[d. This kind of analysis reinforces the notion that the essentialist's perceptions of sex 
are so deeply rooted that they support the conclusion that recognizing these "differences" 
has neither negative consequences nor reflects bias. 
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from using either the women's room or the men's room63 or forces 
them to leave the workplace to use their bathroom of choice.64 
Why does boundary crossing in bathrooms generate so much 
anxiety? Two common explanations for sex-segregated 
bathrooms are privacy and safety. Neither of these reasons are 
immune to attack. Enclosed stalls with locks would provide 
sufficient privacy; urinals may be placed in such stalls or 
eliminated. 65 The objection that a mixed bathroom jeopardizes 
security has been compared to homophobic myths about the 
problems gays cause in the military. 66 Furthermore, the 
argument that single-sex bathrooms reinforce that "same sense 
of mystery or forbiddenness about the other sex's sexuality 
which is fostered by the general prohibition upon public nudity 
and the unashamed viewing of gEmitalia"67 presumes 
heterosexuality and compares bathroom use to much more 
explicit sexual activities. 
There are at least three possible solutions to the bathroom 
problem. Perhaps the best solution would be the one used in 
places of public accommodations, including airplanes and a 
growing number of restaurants, eliminating sex segregated 
bathrooms altogether and replacing them with unisex facilities.68 
A second solution (that creates problems of its own) is the 
creation of a third bathroom labeled "other."69 Finally, a feasible 
and short-term legal solution would be to prevent employers 
63. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 122-23 (1991) 
(discussing a transsexual law student who was not allowed to use either the male or 
female bathroom by fellow students after sex change reassignment surgery). 
64. See Doe v. Boeing, Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 n.2 (Wash. 1993). After Boeing warned 
Doe not to use the women's room at work, "Doe limited her use of rest rooms to off site 
women's rest rooms at lunchtime." Id. 
65. MARTINE ROTHBLA'M', THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A MANIFESTO ON THE FREEDOM OF 
GENDER 91-95 (1995). 
66. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 58-59 (arguing that the "bathroom debate" 
and gays in the military are both based upon false notions of behavior); see also 
ROTHBLA'M', supra note 65, at 92-95 (arguing that single-sex bathrooms are actually less 
safe than unisex bathrooms because an attacker knows that only members of the 
"victim" sex will be inside). 
67. WASSERSTROM, supra note 62, at 20-21. 
68. See ROTHBLA'M', supra note 65, at 95. Rothblatt advocates ending "sexual 
apartheid [by) pass[ing) laws that mandate secure, reasonably clean, unisex restrooms 
for all." Id. 
69. Terry Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a 
Restroom Labeled "Other," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1252-55 (1997). Kogan argues that 
Rothblatt's call for only unisex bathrooms "do[es) not respect the choices ofMTF [male to 
female) transsexuals who want to use the female restroom as an important component of 
the gender identity they have assumed for themselves." Id. at 1250. 
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from dictating which of the two bathrooms employees must 
use.70 
Unfortunately, courts remain adverse even to the feasible 
short-term legal goal proposed herein. Boeing demonstrates that 
"urinary segregation" categorizes people perhaps even more 
rigidly than clothing. 71 Although Boeing's dress code 
incorporated a flexible category of "unisex clothing," which 
included "nylon stockings, earrings, lipstick, foundation, and 
clear nail polish, "72 Boeing restricted Doe's use of the restroom to 
her genitally ascribed sex.73 The court in Boeing refused even to 
engage in a discussion of bathrooms. The court maintained, 
"[t]he issue of rest room use does not alter our analysis since 
neither party contends this was a basis for her discharge. "74 The 
disingenuousness of this conclusion is highlighted by the court's 
other conclusion that Doe's attire was "deemed unacceptable 
when, in the supervisor's opinion, her dress would be likely to 
cause a complaint were Doe to use a men's rest room. "75 The 
court in Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc. 76 similarly 
dismissed the idea of permitting people to use bathrooms that 
did not correspond to their anatomical sex, arguing that such a 
decision would create "limitless" problems."77 
Disability laws mandating accessible toilets certainly have 
loosened our society's rigid, notions of what public facilities 
should be made available to individuals.78 Nevertheless, it may 
70. A recently enacted ordinance, No. 7040, in Boulder, Colorado, which amends the 
city's laws to protect transgender people, permits transitioned transsexual people to use 
the locker room and showers appropriate to their sex and states that transitioning 
transsexual people will be granted "reasonable accommodation" in accessing locker 
rooms and showers. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 43-44. Unfortunately, the bill 
dermes "transitioned transsexual" as "a person who has completed genital reassignment 
surgery," which may exclude most female-to-male transsexuals. [d. Furthermore, the 
ordinance exempts people under age'twenty-five from housing provisions. ld. 
71. GARBER, supra note 52, at 47-48. 
72. Doe v. Boeing, Co., 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1993). 
73.ld. 
74. ld. at 533 n.2. 
75. ld. at 534 (emphasis added). 
76. 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982). 
77. ld. at 749. 
78. Although much progress has been made on the bathroom front, there is a long 
way to go. Urinary segregation continues to keep even non-transgender women from 
equal treatment and job advancement opportunities. See, e.g., DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light 
Co., 223 F.3d 434, 436 (7th Cir. 2000) (rmding that a female employee required to use the 
woods as a bathroom facility, just as male co-workers did, could not bring a Title VII 
claim despite the risks the accommodations posed to her privacy). Although all three 
judges on the panel agreed that denying a female employee a restroom facility may 
constitute impermiSSible discrimination under Title VII as a matter of disparate impact, 
only Judge Rovner, dissenting, recognized that it may also give rise to an actionable 
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take some time before society understands that in pursuing 
equal access of trans gender people to public accommodations, no 
one is looking to have "'men in dresses' invading women's 
bathrooms. "79 As the next section explains, courts unfortunately 
demonstrate the same emotional, irrational response to 
bathroom cases that they showed in dress code cases. As a 
result, these emotional issues continue to constrain judges from 
issuing principled, legal decisions, a weakness that harms trans 
people, civil rights law generally, and the legitimacy of the legal 
system as a whole. 
B. Who Cares if Men Wear Dresses? 
Americans' irrational fear of unisex bathrooms is apparently 
rivaled in magnitude and scope only by our fear of men wearing 
dresses in the workplace. Although it is well settled that 
employees should not be penalized for conduct80 and appearance 
outside of the workplace, there is unanimity that employers may 
enforce dress and appearance requirements at work.81 Such 
dress codes may, at the very least, require employees to adhere 
to professional and socially acceptable "personal appearance, 
grooming, and hygiene standards."82 In fact, the majority of 
jurisdictions allow employers to enforce even sex-specific dress 
codes,83 as long as such codes do not reinforce negative sex 
stereotypes84 or apply differently to men and women without any 
hostile environment claim. [d. at 440 (Rovner, J., dissenting); see also Kline v. City of 
Kansas City Fire Dep't, 175 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. ·1999) (reversing exclusion of evidence 
of unequal bathroom facilities as support for a hostile environment claim brought by 
female firefighters). 
79. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 58. 
80. See, e.g., N.H. REV STAT. ANN. § 275:37a (1999) (prohibiting discrimination in 
employment for tobacco use outside the workplace); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201 (Consol. Supp. 
Feb. 2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employment decisions on basis of lawful 
recreation activities pursued by employee outside work hours). 
81. Marc A. !{oonin, Auoiding Claims of Discrimination Based on Personal 
Appearance, Grooming and Hygiene Standards, 15 LAB. LAW. 19, 20 (1999). 
82. [d. 
83. See Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 756 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding 
requirement that a male employee wear a tie is not sex discrimination for purposes of 
Title VI!); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(upholding sex-specific hair length requirement). 
84. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 
1979) (striking down dress code that required women to wear a uniform but allowed men 
to wear business suits); O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. 
Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (holding dress code requiring female sales clerks to wear 
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permissible justification.a5 Although recognizing trans people's 
inclusion in existing non-discrimination laws would not alter 
these underlying principles, many employers faced with the 
issue have voiced a concern that trans rights would create 
disarray in the workplace.86 
Despite the clarity and consistency of existing appearance 
rules as they have evolved over time, "opposition to cross-
dressing in the workplace is perhaps the most commonly voiced 
objection to trans gender rights."87 In other words, a fear of "men 
in dresses" in the workplace fuels most of the political opposition 
to amending non-discrimination law to include transgender 
people and, therefore, may be viewed as one of the knee-jerk and 
arguably irrational concerns of those who oppose trans rights.88 
What is behind this fear of "men in dresses" in the workplace 
that causes otherwise confident employers and co-workers to 
respond so irrationally? The three articulable explanations are 
(1) sexism, (2) concerns about customer expectations and 
preferences and (3) fear of eroding employer control in the 
workplace. 
Laws enforcing sex-specific appearance requirements have 
old roots. Sumptuary laws date at least as far back as the 
thirteenth century, reflecting government-enforced social and 
economic status distinctions.89 Early Colonial American law also 
incorporated strict dress restrictions.9o 
Because strict, gendered clothing requirements have 
perpetuated the subordination of women, the feminist movement 
in the United States has long focused on changing norms of 
"smock" while allowing male sales clerks to wear shirt and tie impermissible because it 
perpetuated sex stereotypes). 
85. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(fmding Continental's desire to compete by featuring attractive female cabin attendants 
insufficient to support discriminatory weight requirement); Frank v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 853-55 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that United's discriminatory weight 
requirement bore no relation to female flight attendant's ability to carry out her duties). 
86. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 55. 
87.1d. 
88.1d. 
89. See ALAN HUNT, GoVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSION: A HISTORY OF 
SUMPI'UARY LAw 214-15 (1996). 
90. See DAVID H. ,FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 184-88 (1972) 
(describing sumptuary laws in Colonial New England). By the eighteenth century, these 
laws were rarely enforced. 1d. at 185. 
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permissible appearance requirements. 91 Despite their focus on 
changing appearance requirements for women, feminists have 
also realized that "[a]ppearance regulations are ... of particular 
importance to women, even when men are the apparent 
victims."92 As a result of focused efforts to alter strict clothing 
requirements that subordinate women, it is absurd to think that 
anyone would support an employer firing a woman for wearing a 
masculine styled tailored suit. In fact, some jurisdictions have 
prohibited such an action.93 Apparently, the same adverse action 
when taken against a man in a dress does not draw the same ire. 
Reconciling this inconsistency is difficult or impossible and can 
hardly be justified other than by stark sexism. 
Similarly, the rationalization that a man in a dress in the 
workplace would provoke negative customer responses cannot be 
reconciled with the case law regarding customer preferences and 
race. An employer who refused to hire an employee of color using 
the same justification would be seen by a court as engaging in a 
pretext for impermissible discrimination.94 
Finally, the explanation that one opposes "men in dresses" 
in the workplace because employers would lose control of the 
workplace is difficult to understand as anything other than a 
misunderstanding about transgender people in the first place. 
The justification is rooted in a misperception that some 
individual (male) employees would want to wear female 
gendered clothing simply to antagonize his employer. This could 
only happen if an employer were invested in enforcing gendered 
appearance norms. In other words, even if an employer could 
not prohibit a man from wearing a dress in the workplace, it 
could still enforce non-sex specific appearance norms that allow 
91. Professor Katherine Franke submitted an amicus brief in Rosa u. Park West Bank 
& Trust Co., detailing the history of sex-based appearance requirements and the role 
clothing has played in the struggle for women's equality. Brief of Amicus Curiae NOW 
Legal Defense et aI., at 2·23, Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 
2000) (No. 99·2309). 
92. Mary Whisner, Note, Gender·Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in 
Patriarchy, 5 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 75 (1982). 
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12947.5 (West Supp. 2001); CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, 
at 43·50. 
94. See Sarni Original·Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Cooke, 447 N.E.2d 1228, 1232·33 (Mass. 
1983) (perceived safety problems of anticipated racial attacks no justification for 
discrimination); cf Fernandez v.Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276·77 (9th Cir. 1981) 
("Nor does stereotyped consumer preferences justify a sexually discriminatory practice. "); 
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808·10 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (firing of an 
unmarried pregnant librarian at a Christian school because of possible "offensiveness" 
raises an issue of fact for Title VII purposes); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. 
Supp. 292, 302·04 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting customer preference argument for 
Southwest Airlines' policy to only hire women as flight attendants). 
2000] PAVING THE ROAD 21 
the employer to make even unreasonable rules (as long as not 
sex discriminatory ones) regarding appropriate professional 
attire.95 
Unfortunately, there may be no quick fix for the apparently 
pervasive emotional response to the specter of "men in dresses" 
in the workplace, The optimal solution would be for everyone to 
get over their strongly held sexist beliefs about appropriate 
attire for men and women. Short of that, there may be some 
near-term solution that allows employers to self-identify their 
gender and require employees to dress consistent with prevailing 
gender norms. For example, at least one transgender non-
discrimination law limits the number of times employees can 
alter their expressed gender in the workplace.96 This solution 
does not seem to get at the heart of the problem regarding 
sexism and is, therefore, far less than optimal. 
In any case, the lesson to be drawn from Houston's work is 
that in order to secure trans rights, advocates may have to wait 
to tackle head-on the most difficult cases until some smaller 
victories can be secured. Where that is not possible, advocates 
should recognize the full implications of going forward in such 
cases, including the heightened emotional responses they may 
elicit from the judiciary. 
Consistent with Houston's model, one can conjecture that 
courts would be more rational and, one can hope, more even-
handed in applying relevant law in cases that question 
assumptions of gender binarism, but do not pose a full frontal 
attack on widely shared core beliefs about the normativity of sex. 
In other words, courts may act irrationally and out of bias and 
bigotry when confronted with cases that pose a direct attack on 
the sex discrimination inherent in practices premised on the 
belief that sex binarism is "natural." Clearly that will be the 
situation in cases challenging sex discriminatory practices. that 
preclude a transgender person (ascribed male at birth, for 
example) from wearing feminine attire in the workplace or a 
case in which a transgender person wishes to use a restroom 
facility designated for the sex the trans gender person was not 
ascribed at birth. 
Fortunately, steering clear of these two narrow categories of 
cases, segregated bathrooms and "men in dresses" in the 
workplace (though admittedly very important ones in the day-to-
day lives of trans people), does not preclude the possibility of 
95. See, e.g., Koonin, supra note 81, at 21. 
96. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 44. 
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bringing other, less emotionally volatile cases to challenge the 
sex discrimination many transgender people face. For example, 
many transgender people also face serious discrimination in the 
context of public accommodations, health care, lending, 
recreational sport, prison and the "quasi-employment" context 
where discrimination comes from some non-employer entity.97 
This Article argues that bringing cases in these areas first will 
lay the groundwork, like the gradual assault on race 
discrimination led by Houston, for challenging historic 
misinterpretations of sex discrimination prohibitions that 
irrationally exclude transgender people from coverage under 
existing laws. 
N. CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS ALREADY IN PLACE 
Despite early failures in the Title VII context,98 there is no 
principled way to exclude trans gender people from the coverage 
of sex discrimination prohibitions, whether in employment, 
housing, credit, public accommodations or sports. Nonetheless, 
insights gained from Houston's model suggest certain cases that 
evoke irrational fears could be avoided early on in the struggle to 
secure trans rights in order to create the legal building blocks, 
which will become the foundation for these other, "harder" cases. 
The key to the proposed model is to use existing precedent, 
already firmly in place, to reverse the trend of exclusion for tranS 
plaintiffs, a redirection that has already begun. 99 
The first and perhaps strongest argument is that older Title 
VII cases bringing sex discrimination claims on behalf of 
transgender plaintiffs are no longer controlling after Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins100 and Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, [nc. 101 In addition, the court in Schwenk v. Hartford102 
explicitly overruled the Ninth Circuit decision that spawned the 
exclusion for trans people from Title VII in the first place. 103 
Second, the case of Price Waterhouse made explicit the legal 
97. [d. at 9-10. Consider the sex-specific dress requirements imposed by courts on 
female and male attorneys. In one "quasi-employment" case, a judge told a black 
attorney he could not wear a kente cloth in the courtroom. John Murawski, Colorful 
Cloth Has Judges Seeing Red, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 6. 
98. E.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-87 (7th Cir. 1984); Holloway 
v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-64 (9th Cir. 1977). 
99. See discussion infra Part N.A-B. 
100. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
101. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
102. 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 
103. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 659. 
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principle that sex stereotyping is an impermissible form of sex 
discrimination.104 Therefore, discrimination because of an 
individual's failure to meet sex stereotypes is actionable. 105 
Third, an emerging body of law decided under state and 
international sex discrimination prohibitions rejects the 
Orwellian logic upon which the early Title VII cases rely.106 
Finally, looking at the root of discrimination against trans gender 
people in nearly any fact-specific context reveals the sex 
discrimination that underlies the anti-trans animus. According 
to the logic drawn from Houston's experiences, over time and by 
pursuing a carefully crafted litigation strategy, trans people will 
receive the protections we deserve under existing laws. 
A. Outdated Title VII Case Law Is Inapplicable After Price 
Waterhouse and Oncale 
In most cases brought by trans plaintiffs, litigants can 
anticipate that defendants will move to dismiss claims in 
reliance on outdated Title VII case law.107 Judges may not rely 
upon those cases to dismiss a claim of discrimination under state 
or federal sex discrimination law where the reasoning behind 
them has been vitiated by subsequent United States Supreme 
Court decisions. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, "[t]he 
initial judicial approach taken in cases such as Holloway has 
been overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse."108 
In those "cases such as Holloway,"109 courts found that the 
parameters of Title VII's prohibitions against sex discrimination 
did not apply to protect trans gender people who faced 
discrimination in employment for two reasons, neither of which 
can be justified in light of recent case law. First, they narrowly 
held that Title VII's sex discrimination prohibitions did not 
"apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex. "110 
Second, "[a]lthough the maxim that remedial statutes should be 
104. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40. 
105. [d. at 258. 
106. See infra Part IV.C-D. 
107. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget 
Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway, 566 F.2d at 659. 
108. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted). In 
Schwenk, the transgender plaintiff stated a claim of sex disc~ination by evidence of 
"her assumption of a feminine rather than a typically masculine appearance or 
demeanor." [d. at 1201. 
109. [d. 
110. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. 
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liberally construed is well recognized,"Ill courts found nothing in 
the legislative history of Title VII that suggested Congress ever 
intended to expand the definition of sex "beyond its common and 
traditional interpretation. "112 
The Supreme Court, in more recent decisions, has toppled 
both of the pillars upon which Ulane and its progeny rest. In 
1989, the Supreme Court soundly rejected the notion that sex 
discrimination only contemplates seX: as it is traditionally 
understood, that is the sense of one being either a biological male 
or a biological female. 113 As Justice Brennan explained, Price 
Waterhouse could not defend a sex discrimination charge by 
arguing that sex stereotyping "lacks legal relevance."114 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court answered the 
question, begged by the Seventh Circuit in mane, of whether 
Congress meant to include the nontraditional within the term 
"sex" as used in Title VII. us As Justice Brennan explained~ in 
passing Title VII, "'Congress intended to strike at the entire 
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.'"116 As explained in Price Waterhouse, 
Title VII covers more than a narrow concept of sex. 117 
The United States Supreme Court overturned the basis for 
the second pillar upon which Ulane and the other Title VII cases 
relied even more recently, in a case in which the Court 
considered whether Title VII prohibits same-sex sexual 
harassment. U8 In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Supreme 
Court determined that nothing in the legislative history of Title 
VII suggests Congress intended. to prohibit same-sex sexual 
harassment. 119 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that 
"statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover 
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions 
of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators 
by which we are governed. "120 The Court stated explicitly that 
sex discrimination includes sexual harassment and this holding 
Ill. [d. at 1086. 
112. [d. 
113. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-58 (1989). 
114. See id. at 250-51. 
115. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086. 
116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971». 
117. See id. at 228. 
118. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998). 
119. [d. at 79. 
120. [d. 
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"must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the 
statutory requirements. "121 
In Holloway and its progeny, the courts mistakenly limited 
sex discrimination prohibitions to only one type and declined to 
prohibit employers from discriminating against transgender 
people,122 even if such discrimination met the statutory 
definition of sex discrimination under Title VII. The Oncale case 
clarifies that, although not the principal evil Congress had in 
mind, Title VII's sex discrimination prohibitions must extend to 
any kind of sex discrimination. This is particularly true where 
statutory prohibitions against sex discrimination are recognized 
to include sex' stereotyping. 123 
B. Discrimination Against Trans People Is Impermissible Sex 
Stereotyping 
Discrimination against a trans gender person is 
impermissible sex discrimination when an employer treats a 
transgender employee adversely because of a failure to meet sex 
stereotypes.124 As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, "What 
matters, for purposes of this . . . analysis, is that in the mind of 
the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the 
victim. "125 In the case of a trans plaintiff, the allegation may be 
that the defendant's actions stem from the fact that the 
defendant believed the plaintiff to be a man or woman who 
"failed to act like one. "126 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court considered a case in 
which Ann Hopkins, a female associate, was denied partnership 
at a nationwide accounting firm, in part because some of the 
partners reacted negatively to her manner of dress and "macho" 
personality. 127 Hopkins was told that in order to improve her 
chances for partnership she should "'walk more femininely, talk 
121. Id. at 80. 
122. mane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-86 (7th Cir. 1984); Holloway v. 
Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661-64 (9th Cir. 1977). 
123. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989). 
124. Id.; Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260-61 n.4 (1st eir. 
1999) (indicating that "a man can ground a [sex discrimination) claim on evidence that 
other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations 
of masculinity"). See generally Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(arguing that discrimination based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes is 
impermissible). 
125. Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202. 
126.1d. 
127. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35. 
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more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.,"128 Holding that decisions based 
on sex-typical behavior constitute impermissible sex 
discrimination, the Court affirmed that "we are beyond the day" 
when employers may insist that employees "match ... the 
stereotype associated with their group [because] '[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes. "'129 
Indeed, rejecting the need for expert testimony to prove that 
sex stereotyping had played a role in Hopkins' case, Justice 
Brennan commented that it requires no expertise in psychology 
to know that if an employee's abilities can be "corrected by a 
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the 
employee's sex and not" her abilities that has drawn criticism.130 
In other words, the Price Waterhouse Court held as a matter of 
law that it constituted sex discrimination for Hopkins' employer 
to require her to conform her appearance to stereotypical norms 
of gender. 131 
Like Hopkins, a trans gender plaintiff can root a 
discrimination claim in sex discrimination when it is the 
plaintiffs failure to meet sex stereotypes that gives rise to the 
discriminatory treatment. 132 Thus, a biological male plaintiff 
who transitions to become female (a transsexual woman) may 
state a claim of sex discrimination against her employer when 
128. [d. at 235 (citation omitted). 
129. [d. at 251 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 
1971». 
130. [d. at 256. 
131. [d. Several courts have recently applied the Price Waterhouse analysis to Title 
VII and analogous state anti-discrimination laws to protect employees who are targeted 
for harassment because of their failure to conform to sex stereotypes. E.g., Schmedding 
v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 863-65 (8th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. TruGreen Ltd. P'ship, 122 
F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (W.D. Wis. 1999). The First Circuit also recently a.fflrmed the 
viability of such a claim where properly pled by, for example, a feminine-appearing male. 
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260-61 (1st Cir. 1999). 
In affuming that transgender people are protected by state sex discrimination 
laws, the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities accepted the 
analysis in Price Waterhouse as "more in keeping with the letter and spirit of 
Connecticut anti-discrimination la.w than the more restrictive interpretations found in 
earlier cases." Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10, at 19-20. A Massachusetts Superior 
Court recently found that a trans gender student could bring a sex discrimination claim 
against a school that imposed a sex-specific clothing requirement. See Doe v. Yunits, et. 
aI., No. 00-1060-A, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000), affd sub nom, Doe v. 
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, slip op. (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000). The 
school admitted that it would allow girls, but not boys, to wear skirts or dresses. [d. 
132. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256. 
2000] PAVING THE ROAD 27 
she is treated adversely because the defendant prefers people to 
look "stereotypically masculine" or "stereotypically feminine." 
c. Sex Discrimination Prohibitions Extend to Cover Trans 
People Under State Law 
In recent cases decided under state and federal laws 
prohibiting sex discrimination, courts have recognized 
discrimination against trans gender people as sex discrimination. 
This emerging body of law rejects the Orwellian notion that 
there is a meaningful legal distinction between discrimination 
because of sex and discrimination because of a change of sex. 133 
As one Southern District of New York Court explained: 
[A]lthough the state antidiscrimination statute is similar to 
Title VII, New York courts are not bound by interpretations 
of the federal law and ... the overriding remedial purpose of 
the state statute "was by blanket description to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination, those then existing as well as any 
later devised. "134 
The Rentos court held that post-operative transsexuals were 
protected from sex discrimination and harassment under New 
York State and New York City human rights laws.135 The court 
denied the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint 
for failure to provide a more definite statement of her claim 
because the court found that the' plaintiff adequately identified 
her protected class status as a "transgender female. "136 
In Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc.,137 the plaintiff, Daniel 
Maffei (born Diane), was considered an exemplary employee who 
"executed his duties in a stellar fashion, was frequently praised 
133. See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that Title VII does not proscribe discrimination due to a change of sex). 
Although some courts have relied on that purported distinction to justify excluding 
transgender plaintiffs from protection under sex discrimination laws, it seems doubtful 
that any court would accept such a distinction as valid in an analogous civil rights 
context. It is improbable, for example, that a court deciding a case in which an employee 
was rued for converting from one religious faith to another would dismiss the case on the 
ground that the employee had failed to state a claim for discrimination on the basis of 
religion. 
134. Rentos v. OCE·Office Sys., No. 95 Civ. 790SLAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *S 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) (quoting Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1995». 
135. [d. at *9. 
136. [d. 
137. 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
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about his work performance, and received salary increases and 
bonuses on a consistent basis"138 until he underwent sex re-
assignment surgery. After Daniel had undergone some 
surgery,139 the president of Kolaeton degraded him, ostracized 
him from other employees and berated Daniel for being im-
moral.140 Finding that such harassment was impermissible sex 
discrimination, the court explained that "derogatory comments 
relating to the fact thlit as a result of an operation an employee 
changed his or her sexual status, creates discrimination based on 
'sex.'"141 The Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and 
Opportunities also recently issued a declaratory ruling 
consistent with this trend.142 
D. Growing Trend in International Law Is to Recognize Claims 
Brought by Transgender People as Sex Discrimination. 
The legal analysis applied in Maffei and Rentos is similar to 
that applied in a recent European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
decision, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council,143 which held that 
discrimination against a transgender person who transitioned in 
the workplace was discrimination on the basis of sex.144 In that 
decision, the ECJ concluded that a person is the subject of 
disparate treatment when "he or she is treated unfavourably by 
comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she was 
deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment."145 As 
a practical matter, this seems obvious in a case, like Maffei, 
138. Id. at 392. 
139. The court noted that the recorQ was not clear on what physical changes had 
taken place and to what extent Damel had ·completed his metamorphosis." Id. at 391. 
Nothing in the outcome of the case turned on whether Daniel had undergone complete, 
partial, or any surgery, for that matter. Id. 
140. Id. at 392. 
141. Id. at 396. 
142. See generally Declaratory Ruling, supra note 10 (stating that transgender people 
are covered by the state's law prohibiting sex discrimination). 
143. Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Corwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2159, (1996) 2 
C.M.L.R. 247, 263 (1996) (P's employer issued a three month dismissal notice when P 
was pre-operative, which took effect after P's sex reassignment was complete). 
144.Id. 
145. Id. at 1-2165. In P. v. S., the ECJ determined that the Equal Treatment Directive 
(Directive) includes transgender persons. Article (1) of the Directive provides in relevant 
part: "[T)he purpose of the directive is to put into effect in the Member States the prin-
ciple of equal treatment for men and women ... as regards access to employment .... " 
Id. at 1-2162. Article 5(1) of the Directive provides: "Application of the principle of equal 
treatment .with regard to 'working conditions, including the conditions governing 
dismissal, means that men and women shall be guaranteed the same conditions without 
discrimination on grounds of sex." Id. at 1-2163. 
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where an otherwise exemplary employee faces discrimination 
only when others in the workplace' learn that helshe is 
trans gender. This approach has recently been endorsed by a 
Canadian tribunal, which held that "it is not clear how 
discrimination based on transsexualism or on the process of 
transsexualism could be anything other than sex-based."146 
E. As a Factual Matter, Most Instances of Discrimination 
Against Transgender People Can Be Ji'airly Characterized as Sex-
Based 
In order to more fully understand why discrimination 
against transgender people is properly characterized as sex 
discrimination, it is helpful to consider examples of situations 
involving discrimination against transgender persons. Although 
each fact scenario is slightly different, each can be understood as 
sex discrimination when broken down to the factual elements 
that form the basis of the different treatment. 
These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. As 
with any other form of discrimination, discrimination against 
transgender people can and does take a wide variety of forms. 
These examples do not intend to provide a rigid or definitive 
taxonomy or to suggest that there is anyone "right" way to 
analyze the facts in a particular case. Rather, the point is to 
describe a few common scenarios in which discrimination 
against transgender people takes place and to show how those 
scenarios can (1) be analyzed under established principles of sex 
discrimination law and (2) be brought as early cases consistent 
with the Houston model proposed here. These examples attempt 
to provide sample scenarios outside the "hot button" areas 
identified in Section III . 
. For example, consider a regular customer at a hair salon (a 
biological male) who after putting off regular hair appointments 
for several months returns as a female. If the barber refuses to 
provide hair-cutting services for this regular customer because 
the customer transitioned from male to female, that barber has 
engaged in sex discrimination.147 Perhaps the clearest way to 
see sex as the basis for the discriminatory treatment is that but 
146. See Commission Des Droits De La Personne Et Des Droits De La Jeunesse v. 
Maison des Jeunes, Canada Province of Quebec, Human Rights Tribunal File No. 500-53-
00078-970, at 21. 
147. Such a case would have to be brought under a state anti-discrimination law 
prohibiting sex discrimination in public accommodations or the provision of goods and 
services. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 1990). 
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for the new sex of the customer, the business owner would not 
have taken any adverse action against the customer. _ If the only 
reason the barber is now refusing to serve the customer is 
-because of a changed sex, the discriminatory treatment is 
prohibited because it is on the basis of sex. 
A second example involves a transgender employee who had 
undergone sex reassignment from female to male before he was 
hired. Assume that at the time he is hired, neither the employer 
nor any co-workers are aware that he is transgender. If it is 
disclosed publicly that the employee was female at birth and he 
becomes the subject of adverse treatment or harassment in the 
workplace because it is learned that he is a transgender man, 
the root of the discrimination is that he was born female. In 
other words, the transgender discrimination experienced by the 
employee is sex discrimination based on the sex that he was 
born. The sex ascribed to him at birth is being used to limit his 
current actions and choices. Using the test from the last 
example, but for the birth sex of the employee the adverse action 
would not have occurred. For example, if he had been born male 
he would not have been subjected to the adverse treatment. 
As a final example, consider again a customer in a public 
accommodation who informs a proprietor that she is a 
transgender person and will be transitioning from male-to-
female. Assume that the proprietor has a negative response and 
refuses to serve the customer because the proprietor is offended 
by or uncomfortable with the idea of a man changing his sex to 
become a woman. In refusing to serve the customer on that 
basis, the proprietor has engaged in sex discrimination because 
the trans gender customer is being singled out for adverse 
treatment on the basis of the proprietor's attitudes and beliefs 
about men, in particular, the proprietor;s belief that a man 
should not alter his biological sex. Although the owner may 
attempt to articulate some basis, apart from those related to sex, 
to create a separate and distinct anti-trans animus, it is difficult 
in the extreme to logically understand these explanations as 
anything other than normative beliefs about the nature of men 
and women. Although the owner may believe that he is not 
motivated by sex discrimination, but by a moral imperative to 
preserve a perceived natural order of sex, in reality these 
justifications are indistinct. While the owner's irrational fear 
may derive from unfounded assumptions widely taught, his 
actions are still prohibited. Disparate treatment justified by 
normative beliefs about sex can only be understood legally as 
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discrimination on account of sex, and, therefore, may not survive 
challenge. . 
V. A CASE STUDY 
With the building blocks already in place, the key to 
securing trans rights may be the selection of proper plaintiffs. In 
light of this Article's counsel to avoid bathrooml48 and some 
employnl.ent cases until more can be done to educate courts and 
the public at large, a recommended case scenario is 
demonstrated by an Equal Credit Opportunity Act149 case filed 
in 1998 in the District of Massachusetts. ISO In Rosa v. Park West 
Bank & Trust Co., 151 the plaintiff, a biological male who looks 
like a woman and lives as a woman, went into a bank to request 
a loan application.152 A loan officer asked her153 to produce 
photo identification.154 Rosa gave the loan officer three pieces of 
identification containing her photograph.155 In one photograph 
Rosa appeared traditionally masculine, in one she appeared 
traditionally feminine and in one she appeared gender 
ambiguous.15S The loan officer responded with disgust and 
would not help her until she "went home and changed"157 to look 
more like the identification card in which she appeared 
traditionally masculine.158 
148. It bears mention that in a recent important victory, a Minnesota appeals court 
recently affirmed that a transgender (male-to-female) employee prohibited from using 
the women's restroom established a case of sexual orientation discrimination. Goins v. 
West Group, 619 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (2000). Unlike the other states with sexual 
orientation non-discrimination laws, Minnesota defmes sexual orientation to include 
"having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated 
with one's biological· maleness or· femaleness," thereby including transgender people 
within its purview. Id at 428. 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994). 
150. For purposes of full disclosure, the author represents that she was counsel of 
record in the case along with GLAD's Civil Rights Director, Mary Bonauto . 
. 151. 214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000). 
152. Id. at 214. 
153. The plaintiff in the case is biologically male but self-identifies as .female. In order 
to minimize confusion for the court, the plaintiff is referred to in court documents as "he" 
or "him." Out of respect for the plaintift's self-identity, Rosa is herein referred to as "she" 
or "her." The recent practice of most courts is to respect the self-identity of litigants. See, 
e.g., Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1192 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000); Meriwether v. 
Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 409 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987); Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736, 
740 n.2 (N.D. Iowa 1999). 
154. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 214. 
155.Id. 
156.Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
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Rosa filed a complaint against the bank under both state 
and federal law.159 The relevant state claim was for sex 
discrimination in a public accommodation160 and in lending. The 
federal claim was brought under the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act which has been construed consistently with the federal 
employment non-discrimination laws (Title VII).161 By avoiding 
bathrooms and "men in dresses" in the workplace, this case 
provided a good test of the hypothesis advanced by this Article. 
Moreover, to the extent that sex-specific dress codes have been 
upheld based on "legitimate business needs," those cases could 
not be used here by the bank. There is no legitimate business 
justification for requiring a bank customer to wear sex-specific 
clothing.162 Nor could the bank proffer any economic justification 
for a sex-specific clothing requirement. To the contrary, all of 
the economic rationalizations support allowing customers to 
wear whatever clothing they want.163 
The difficulty the district court had with the case early on 
illustrates what an uphill battle it may be to secure trans rights. 
Perhaps largely because normative beliefs about sex are so 
firmly held, the district judge dismissed this case on a Rule 
12(b)(6)164 motion for failure to state a claim. In the words of the 
judge, "[d]espite Rosa's strenuous argument to the contrary, the 
issue in this case is not his sex, but rather how he chose to dress 
when applying for a loan."165 Going farther, the court found 
Rosa's reliance on Price Waterhouse misguided, saying that that 
159.Id. 
160. Massachusetts' public accommodation law prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex and sexual orientation .. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 1990). 
Federal public accommodations law prohibits only race discrimination, not sex 
discrimination, in such circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oo0a (1994). 
161. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. N 
1998); Mercado-Garcia v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 979 F.2d 890, 893 (1st Cir. 1992) (applying 
interpretive standards of EEOA to an ECOA claim for age discrimination in lending). But 
see Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 713-14 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(distinguishing plaintiffs claim for race discrimination in lending under ECOA from 
EEOA employment discrimination cases). 
162. Although a bank might plausibly offer a customer preference justification, such 
. justifications have been rejected in the race context and it is extremely doubtful that a 
court would accept it in the context of sex. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 
Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting customer preference for female flight 
attendants as justification for sex discrimination). 
163. Nor could the bank justify its request by arguing it could not properly identify the 
applicant from the photographs presented. If the loan officer could not identify ROsa, the 
request would reasonably have beim for additional corroborating documentation, not to 
go home and change. Rosa, 214 F.3d at 214. 
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). . 
165. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., Civ. Action No. 99-30085-FHF, slip op. at 1 
(D. Mass. Oct. 16, 1998), rev'd, 214 F.3d 213 (lst Cir. 2000). 
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case does not prohibit a lender "from requesting someone to 
change their clothes, and it does not render denying someone 
consumer services or employment based upon their dress illegal 
discrimination. "166 Perhaps forgetting that sex discrimination 
law clearly covers men and women,167 the judge concluded by 
saying, "[slimply put, neither a man nor a woman can change 
their status from unprotected to protected simply by changing 
his or her clothing. "168 
This case is informative with respect to developing a long-
term strategy for securing trans rights. The judge's apparent 
resolution of "the issue in this case,"169 without even 
acknowledging it as such, demonstrates how firmly held 
normative beliefs are about sex. The way in which the judge 
dismissed this case parallels the dismissive way courts have 
addressed discriminatory dress codes in recent times.170 Missing 
the point about Price Waterhouse, the court failed to understand 
that the loan officer's refusal was based on the applicant's sex, 
despite the allegation that the refusal was because the applicant 
was a man who failed to look like one. l7l 
On appeal, the United State Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit reversed. 172 The court summarily dismissed the bank's 
argument that federal anti-discrimination law cannot apply to a 
plaintiff that the defendant characterized as a "crossdresser."173 
Moreover, the court found that: 
[l]t is reasonable to infer that [the loan officer) told Rosa to go 
home and change because she thought that Rosa's attire did 
not accord with his male gender: in other words, that Rosa 
did not receive the loan application because he was a man, 
whereas a similarly situated woman would have received the 
loan application. That is, the Bank may treat, for credit 
166. [d. 
167. See. e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (citing 
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983». 
168. Rosa, Civ. Action No. 99·30085·FHF, at 2. 
169. [d. at 1. 
170. Whisner, supra note 92, at 75. 
171. Rosa, Civ. Action No. 99·30085·FHF, at 2; see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 
1187, 1199·1203 (9th Cir. 2000) (failing to conform to gender expectations is 
impermissible sex discrimination); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. 194 F.3d 
252, 261 nA (lst Cir. 1999) (noting that failure to conform to gender expectations violates 
Title VII). 
172. Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (lst Cir. 2000). 
173. [d. 
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purposes, a woman who dresses like a man differently than a 
man who dresses like a woman. 174 
In short, the court found that the facts in Rosa constituted a 
claim of sex discrimination. 175 
The remarkable thing about Rosa is that a federal appellate 
court recognized two theories that earlier courts had rejected in 
previous cases with analogous facts, arguably because these 
earlier cases raised the specter of unisex bathrooms or "men in 
dresses." First, if an individual would not have been treated 
adversely but for hislher sex, such facts constitute a claim of sex 
discrimination. 176 In addition, the First Circuit applied the 
reasoning of Price Waterhouse, finding that, if a plaintiff' can 
show that the basis for the adverse treatment was sex 
stereotyping, that supports a sex discrimination claim.177 That 
these very basic theories of sex discrimination could be seen in a 
case involving credit and public accommodations suggests .that it 
is not the legal theories that are hard to grasp, but that they 
pertain regardless of the factual circumstances in which they are 
presented. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The tide is clearly turning since the low point in the 1970s 
when trans gender people were completely excluded from the 
protections of civil rights laws. Numerous jurisdictions have 
explicitly expanded the scope of their laws' protections to ensure 
that transgender people are protected against discrimination.178 
In addition, the earlier case law that created the exclusion has 
been overruled and newer high court decisions179 have made it 
clear that trans gender people may seek redress under existing 
law. Despite this dramatic shift in the legal landscape, not all 
courts, and clearly not all defendants, understand that existing 
sex discrimination laws also cover trans gender people. 
As Charles Hamilton Houston understood, sometimes 
having the law on one's side is not enough. Reversing a historic 
174. [d. at 215-16. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at 215. 
177. [d. at 216. 
178. See CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 10, at 38-50. Over twenty-five local 
jurisdictions have ordinances or orders that prohibit discrimination against transgender 
people. [d. 
179. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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exclusion from civil rights law requires a well thought out 
strategy that includes coordinated education and legislative 
components. Bringing a range of cases on behalf of transgender 
people, focusing on those that avoid some of the strong, deep-
seated and pervasive ideas held by gender binarists, is a critical 
first step toward securing trans rights. Paving the way to this 
much needed expansion of civil rights to protect trans gender 
people will in turn allow law to function as it is meant to-
through principled applications of statutes-rather than through 
irrational, emotional expression of judges' bias. 
